Both the concept of a Darwinian tree of life (TOL) and the possibility of its accurate reconstruction have been much criticized. Criticisms mostly revolve around the extensive occurrence of lateral gene transfer (LGT), instances of uptake of complete organisms to become organelles (with the associated subsequent gene transfer to the nucleus), as well as the implications of more subtle aspects of the biological species concept. Here we argue that none of these criticisms are sufficient to abandon the valuable TOL concept (...) and the biological realities it captures. Especially important is the need to conceptually distinguish between organismal trees and gene trees, which necessitates incorporating insights of widely occurring LGT into modern evolutionary theory. We demonstrate that all criticisms, while based on important new findings, do not invalidate the TOL. After considering the implications of these new insights, we find that the contours of evolution are best represented by a TOL. (shrink)

This introduction to the philosophy of social science provides an original conception of the task and nature of social inquiry. Peter Manicas discusses the role of causality seen in the physical sciences and offers a reassessment of the problem of explanation from a realist perspective. He argues that the fundamental goal of theory in both the natural and social sciences is not, contrary to widespread opinion, prediction and control, or the explanation of events. Instead, theory aims to provide an (...) understanding of the processes which, together, produce the contingent outcomes of experience. Offering a host of concrete illustrations and examples of critical ideas and issues, this accessible book will be of interest to students of the philosophy of social science, and social scientists from a range of disciplines. (shrink)

Absolute identity seems at first sight to be presupposed in the branch of formal logic called identity theory. Classical identity theory may be obtained by adjoining a single schema to ordinary quantification theory.

"Divination and Human Nature" casts a new perspective on the rich tradition of ancient divination--the reading of divine signs in oracles, omens, and dreams. Popular attitudes during classical antiquity saw these readings as signs from the gods while modern scholars have treated such beliefs as primitive superstitions. In this book, Peter Struck reveals instead that such phenomena provoked an entirely different accounting from the ancient philosophers. These philosophers produced subtle studies into what was an odd but observable fact--that humans (...) could sometimes have uncanny insights--and their work signifies an early chapter in the cognitive history of intuition. Examining the writings of Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and the Neoplatonists, Struck demonstrates that they all observed how, setting aside the charlatans and swindlers, some people had premonitions defying the typical bounds of rationality. Given the wide differences among these ancient thinkers, Struck notes that they converged on seeing this surplus insight as an artifact of human nature, projections produced under specific conditions by our physiology. For the philosophers, such unexplained insights invited a speculative search for an alternative and more naturalistic system of cognition. Recovering a lost piece of an ancient tradition, "Divination and Human Nature" illustrates how philosophers of the classical era interpreted the phenomena of divination as a practice closer to intuition and instinct than magic. (shrink)

Introduction -- Pragmatism and science -- Pragmatic philosophy of science and the charge of scientism -- John Dewey and American psychology -- John Dewey and American social science -- Culture and nature -- Not another epistemology -- Naturalism and subjectivism -- Naturalizing epistemology : recent developments in psychology and the sociology of knowledge -- Democracy -- American democracy : a new spirit in the world -- John Dewey : anarchism and the political state -- Philosophy and politics : a historical (...) approach to Marx and Dewey -- John Dewey and the problem of justice -- Liberalism's discontent : America in search for past that never was -- Why not Dewey? -- The evasion of philosophy -- Democratic hope -- Analytic pragmatism -- Post-modern pragmatism. (shrink)

Because biologists are concerned with life in all its forms, and physicians deal with life and death on a daily basis, it is crucial that they explicitly understand what life is. Nevertheless, a clear idea of what life means remains elusive, and there is no universally accepted definition. Therefore, we offer our own: Life is a self-contained, self-regulating, self-organizing, self-reproducing, interconnected, open thermodynamic network of component parts which performs work, existing in a complex regime which combines stability and adaptability in (...) the phase transition between order and chaos, as a plant, animal, fungus, or microbe. This definition describes life as we know it here on earth and .. (shrink)

When I offered this title, I was engaging myself to investigate an apparent difference between two kinds of intentionality, in the hope that I should be able to find some firm logical criterion to distinguish them. I was less successful in this than I had hoped. I think I have gained a certain amount of insight into the logic and semantics of one kind of intentional context, largely due to the work I was doing while visiting the University of Pennsylvania (...) on Frege and on Michael Dummett’s monumental commentary on Frege. But as regards the other variety of intentionality I am still very much in the dark; so I am giving you thus far merely a progress report on that. (shrink)

The so-called evolutionary social scienccs are based on the belief that Darwinism can explain the living world and that it therefore should be able to explain other complex systems such as minds and societies. In fact, Darwinism cannot explain biological evolution. It does make an important contribution, but this is towards understanding adaptation, which is a major problem in biology but not in the social sciences. Darwinism has much less to offer to the social sciences than to biology and the (...) shortcomings it brings with it are much greater. (shrink)

In this paper I explore the shared interest of John Dewey and Carl Jung in the developmental continuity between biological, psychological, and cultural phenomena. Like other first generation psychological theorists, Dewey and Jung thought that psychology could be used to deepen our understanding of this continuity and thus gain a degree of control over human development. While their pursuit of this goal received little institutional support, there is a growing body of theory and practice derived from the new field of (...) ‘affect science’ as well as clinical and political psychologies, and other recent research into the function of human emotions, that are bringing greater institutional weight to the interest in anticipating and activating our psychocultural development. The epistemological and theoretical work of these seminal thinkers provides the foundation for this new praxis leading to: 1) a theory of ‘political development’ based in transformations of the psychocultural function of ‘reasoning’, ‘sensory’, and ‘affect’ freedom, as sources of culturally valid knowledge, which connects our biological heritage with increasingly advanced forms of individual and organizational identities; and 2) a range of psycho-educational practices that activate the political development of individuals and organizations by transforming the prejudicial dimensions of their current political identities. (shrink)

What transformation would happen if we could combine the best of liberal politics with psychology? _Awakening our Faith in the Future_ investigates the avenues for creating a new branch of psychology, a transformative political psychology. In the past, political psychology has focused directly on analysis and knowledge acquisition, rather than on interventions that transform self and culture. A transformative political psychology combines the best of traditional social science with the transformative intent of clinical psychology in order to create a new (...) political culture. Peter T. Dunlap suggests that while liberals focus intently outside of themselves on changing the world, those with psychological interests focus much more internally on changing themselves. In this book, he argues that by combining political liberalism and psychology, and encouraging psychologists to develop cultural learning practices based on ideas of self- knowledge, there is opportunity to transform our political culture. Divided into five parts, this book explores: stories of political destiny questions of development opportunities for political development a speculative theory of cultural evolution practices of a political psychologist. This scholarly text uses personal experiences and the stories of progressive political leaders as pathways for addressing political problems, making it ideal reading for professionals and students in the fields of both politics and psychology as well as for activists interested in the future of liberalism. (shrink)

The work of Brentano's English contemporary J. E. McTaggart is in several ways profitable for Brentano scholars to study: I here cosider his views on the nature and classification of mental states. In McTaggart's account the characteristic of being a 'cognition', one that some but not all 'cogitations' have, corresponds to Brentano's notion of Anerkennen; quite unlike Brentano, he holds that contrariety obtains only between the contents of judgments, not between contrary acts of affirming and denying; like Brentano however he (...) recognizes contrariety in the realm of emotion and feeling, e.g. between love and hate, pleasure and pain. He regards feelings and emotions as mere colourings of cogitations, and thinks that their relation to an object (intentionality, as Brentano would say) comes about merely from their cogitative aspect. This view is attractively simple; but by considering McTaggart's own view of emotions' being in respect of characteristics of their objects, we can find serious ground to reject it. (shrink)

The probability of lineal extinction is sensitive to all the moments of the reproductive success probability distribution. In particular, high variance in reproductive success is associated with high probability of lineal extinction. Where male variance in reproductive success exceeds female variance, strictly patrilineal lines of descent will become extinct more rapidly than strictly matrilineal lines of descent. Patrilineal genealogies will be expected to be shallower and broader than matrilineal genealogies under such conditions. Potential implications of this genealogical asymmetry for human (...) descent systems include the greater information content of patrilineal kinship reckoning compared with any other unilineal system and the greater effectiveness of patrilineal kinship as a vehicle for corporate action. (shrink)

The doctrine which needs clarification may be put several ways: "Modern" science, unlike Aristotelian science, does not appeal to "occult powers"; or, the doctrine of final causes is occult and unscientific; or, while modern science, in establishing laws, "explains," Aristotelian science does not. More narrowly, two separate though related claims are being made: Aristotelian science is occult. This charge is leveled at final causes and Aristotelian "powers." Aristotelian science does not explain. This charge is typified by Moliere's famous jibe at (...) "dormitive power." In order to clear away the truths from the half-truths, I will defend the following points. (shrink)

This ambitious critical history of the variety of disciplines we group together as the social sciences argues that the defining characteristic of social science, both historically and in the present, is ideology. Based originally on a flawed ideal of science, the 'social sciences' have incorporated and refined a set of assumptions about the nature of state and society, assumptions which have been institutionalized with the growth of modern universities. The book is in three main parts. It deals firstly with the (...) history of certain key ides from the early modern period, before exploring the institutional and social features which have shaped the emergence of modern social science. Manicas goes on to reveal the ideological component of mainstream social science, concluding by suggesting and alternative realist philosophy for the future. Rigorous in scholarship and engaging in presentation, the book offers a brilliant combination of wide-ranging historical scholarship and a firm location in the current theoretical dilemmas of the social sciences. (shrink)